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Central to the identity of modern medical specialities, including 
psychiatry, is the notion of hypostatic abstraction: doctors treat 
conditions or disorders, which are conceived of as “things” that 
people “have.” Mad activism rejects this notion and hence chal-
lenges psychiatry’s identity as a medical specialty. This article elab-
orates the challenge of Mad activism and develops the hypostatic 
abstraction as applied to medicine. For psychiatry to maintain its 
identity as a medical speciality while accommodating the chal-
lenge of Mad activism, it must develop an additional conception 
of the clinical encounter. Toward elaborating this conception, this 
article raises two basic framing questions: For what kind of under-
standing of the situation should the clinical encounter aim? What 
is the therapeutic aim of the encounter as a whole? It proposes that 
the concepts of “secondary insight” (as the aim of understanding) 
and of “identity-making” (as a therapeutic aim) can allow the 
clinical encounter to proceed in a way that accommodates the 
challenge of Mad activism.
Keywords: clinical encounter, hypostatic abstraction, identity-
making, Mad activism, Mad Pride, madness,  mental health ac-
tivism, primary insight, secondary insight, symptom control
I. INTRODUCTION
Psychiatry has an identity in the sense that it is constituted by certain under-
standings of what it is and for what it is. The key element in this identity is 
that psychiatry is a medical specialty. During the early years of their training, 
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medical doctors make a choice about the specialty they want to pursue.1 
Psychiatry is one of them, and so is ophthalmology, cardiology, gynecology, 
and pediatrics. Modern medical specialties share some fundamental features: 
they treat conditions, disorders, or diseases; they aspire to be evidence-based 
in the care and treatments they offer; they are grounded in basic sciences 
such as physiology, anatomy, histology, and biochemistry; and they em-
ploy technology in investigations, research, and development of treatments. 
These features characterize modern medical specialties even as physicians 
are increasingly framing their work in ways that take account of the whole 
person, recognizing conflicting values and their implications for diagnosis 
and treatment, and acknowledging the role of the arts and humanities in 
medical education and practice (see, e.g., McManus, 1995; Cox, Campbell, 
and Fulford, 2007; Cook, 2010; Fulford, van Staden, and Crisp, 2013).
Psychiatry differentiates itself from other medical specialties by the con-
ditions that it treats: mental health conditions or disorders, to be contrasted 
with physical health conditions or disorders. The nature of its subject matter, 
which is disturbances of the mind and their implications, raises certain com-
plexities for psychiatry that, in the extreme, are sometimes taken to suggest 
that psychiatry’s positioning as a medical specialty is suspect; these include 
the normative nature of psychiatric judgments, the explanatory limitations of 
psychiatric theories, and the classificatory inaccuracies that beset the discip-
line. There are significant, ongoing debates in these three areas that do not, 
at present, appear to be nearing resolution.2 Now these debates are them-
selves superseded by a foundational challenge to psychiatry’s identity as a 
medical specialty, a challenge that emanates from particular approaches in 
mental health activism.3 These approaches, which I refer to as Mad activism, 
reject the language of “mental illness” and “mental disorder,” and with it 
the assumption that people have a condition that requires treatment. The 
idea that medicine treats conditions, disorders, or diseases is at the heart 
of medical practice and theory, and this includes psychiatry insofar as it 
wishes to understand itself as a branch of medicine. In rejecting the premise 
that people “have” a “condition,” Mad activism is issuing a challenge to 
psychiatry’s identity as a medical specialty.
In this article, I examine how psychiatry might accommodate the chal-
lenge of Mad activism in the context of the clinical encounter. In Section 
II, I clarify this challenge and situate it in relation to other approaches in 
mental health activism. In Section III, I  unpack what is involved in the 
challenge through a discussion of the concept of the “hypostatic abstrac-
tion,” a logical and semantic operation first identified by the philosopher 
Charles Sanders Peirce. I argue that, insofar as the condition is posited as 
some thing to be managed and treated, the hypostatic abstraction lies at 
the heart of medical practice and theory. The challenge of Mad activism to 
psychiatry consists in its rejection of the hypostatic abstraction. In Section 
IV, I  outline some responses to this challenge. If psychiatry wishes to 
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maintain its identity as a medical specialty while also accommodating the 
challenge of Mad activism, it must develop an additional conception of 
the clinical encounter in order to be able to work with individuals who 
consider themselves to have a condition as well as those who reject the 
hypostatic abstraction. Towards elaborating this conception, I  raise two 
fundamental questions that frame the clinical encounter: For what kind of 
understanding of the situation should the clinical encounter aim? What is 
the therapeutic aim of the encounter as a whole? These questions are ad-
dressed in sections V and VI, respectively. I propose that the concepts of 
“secondary insight” (as the aim of understanding) and of “identity-making” 
(as a therapeutic aim) can allow the clinical encounter to proceed in a way 
that accommodates the challenge of Mad activism.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF MAD ACTIVISM
Dissatisfaction with the treatment of individuals considered to be “mad,” “in-
sane,” or “mentally ill” goes back a long way, but the 1970s are regarded as 
the starting point of a distinctive wave of activism that persists to this day.4 
In the wake of the efforts of black, gay, and women’s civil rights movements, 
a number of connected mental health movements began organizing for the 
civil rights of users and survivors of psychiatric treatment and for reform of 
mental health institutions. In time, the mental health consumer/survivor/
ex-patient (c/s/x) movements grew and diversified, and today various dis-
courses and initiatives can be identified: in addition to long-standing con-
cerns with coercive interventions, lack of involvement in recovery, limited 
access to treatment, and social stigma, some activists have rejected the med-
icalization of madness. This latter concern is reflected in aspects of Mad 
Pride and mad-positive activism, which I  refer to in what follows as Mad 
activism.5
A key difference between Mad activism and treatment-focused endeavors 
is the former’s formulation of the problem in terms of respect and recog-
nition. What is at stake is the way in which people’s identities are publicly 
represented and valued, with the dominant view of madness as a disorder 
of the mind being seen as an affront to a positive identity. The goal is not 
only to reform psychiatry, but to effect cultural change in the way madness 
is viewed. As Schrader, Jones, and Shattell (2013, 62) write, activists “have 
moved beyond treatment-centered activism to articulate a broader culture 
of madness.” In this respect, the aims of Mad activism overlap with those of 
other movements that organize around issues of identity and recognition. In 
the domain of sexual orientation and gender, for example, gay rights and 
trans rights are not only concerned with countering discrimination in em-
ployment opportunities, but with achieving symbolic and cultural reparation 
in society.
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Mad activism, therefore, is a distinctive approach within the broader 
mental health activism. Activists are rejecting the language of “mental illness” 
and “mental disorder,” reclaiming the term “mad,” and presenting madness 
as grounds for identity. These quotes exemplify this position:
Madness is an aspect of my identity—who I am and how I experience the world—
not an “illness” that is separate from me or a collection of “symptoms” I want cured. 
(Triest, 2012, 20–21)
Mad Pride moves away from medicalizing experiences under psychiatry to promote 
other sorts of framings. These Mad positive approaches do not pathologize me. 
Instead of being seen as someone who is “sick,” I am seen as someone who di-
verges from our traditional narrow, exclusive, and discriminatory idea of “normal.” 
I need the world to be different so that I can thrive as the person that I am . . . Mad 
Pride sees Mad people as a people and equity-seeking group similar to other mar-
ginalized populations. We are not just “individuals” with “illness.” (deBie, 2013, 7)
The claims and demands of Mad activism raise many questions. For ex-
ample, can madness really be grounds for identity as activists claim? And 
what about the distress and disability that are a feature of mental health con-
ditions—how can these be reconciled with a positive framing of these con-
ditions? And with regard to the demands of Mad activism, what moral and 
political justifications can support them, and what are the appropriate so-
cial and political responses to them? All of these are important questions to 
which I attend elsewhere (Rashed, 2019b, 2019a).
In this article, I want to focus on one key issue, which is activists’ rejection 
of the idea that they have a condition that requires treatment. Can psychiatry 
accommodate this claim? This question is not confined to activism because 
it reaches to the heart of the clinical encounter: compared to other medical 
specialties, psychiatrists often find themselves assessing individuals who do 
not consider themselves to have a condition that requires treatment. It could 
be argued that it does not matter what the patient thinks in this regard; if 
he has a mental disorder and lacks insight into the nature of his condition, 
and if he satisfies the legal criteria for detention, including the presence of 
risk to self and/or others, then there are grounds for involuntary detention. 
While this is how the situation tends to proceed in practice, what I want to 
ask is how it can proceed if we regard the person’s rejection of the idea that 
he has a condition as a non-negotiable starting point. Is the clinical (psy-
chiatric) encounter conceptually equipped to deal with this situation?6 As 
I argue in what follows, psychiatry, as a body of knowledge and as a set of 
institutional practices, lacks the conceptual resources to handle this situation 
and accommodate the person’s view (notwithstanding individual clinician’s 
experience and wisdom in doing so). A key reason why this is so is that 
psychiatry’s positioning as a medical specialty commits it to the “hypostatic 
abstraction,” to a logical and semantic process at the heart of medical prac-
tice and which can be encapsulated in the idea that doctors treat “things” 
 Psychiatry and the Challenge of Mad Activism 601
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jm
p/article/45/6/598/5867122 by Birkbeck C
ollege, U
niversity of London user on 08 January 2021
that people “have.” Psychiatry is, therefore, committed to the very idea that 
the person in the clinical encounter rejects. Mad activism, then, in empha-
sizing that aspect of the encounter issues a provocation that goes to the heart 
of psychiatry’s identity as a medical specialty. Before considering possible 
responses to this challenge (Section IV), I outline the notion of the hypo-
static abstraction.
III. THE HYPOSTATIC ABSTRACTION AND MEDICAL PRACTICE
Abstraction is “the process of considering something independently of its 
associations or attributes.”7 To distinguish a property from its instances is to 
engage in abstraction such as in the following propositions: the ball is round, 
honey is sweet, Ahmad is brave. The philosopher Charles Peirce refers to 
this as precisive abstraction, which refers to the act of making precise.8 
He distinguishes precisive abstraction from hypostatic abstraction where the 
predicate in these sentences—that is, is round, is sweet, is brave—is trans-
formed into a relation between two subjects: instead of honey is sweet we 
say honey possesses sweetness; instead of the man is shy we say the man is 
affected with shyness. The term “hypostasis” refers to “an underlying reality,” 
to the “substance or essential nature of an individual.”9 A hypostatic abstrac-
tion, therefore, is an abstraction from what is considered part of an entity’s 
essential nature, and now thought of alongside that entity as a separate sub-
ject. This process then allows that subject—that is, sweetness, shyness—to 
feature in its own right in propositions and judgments:
That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create 
entia rationis [objects of thought] that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes 
us the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think or think through, 
into being subjects thought of. (Peirce, 1958, paragraph 549 of vol. 4)
The distinction between precisive abstraction and hypostatic abstraction is 
a logical and a semantic distinction, not an ontological one; by effecting a 
hypostatic abstraction, we create an object of thought, and Peirce is careful 
to point out that this object is only sometimes real. What value is there to 
be derived from the hypostatic abstraction? By inviting us to conceive, in 
thought, of the ball and roundness, or of Ahmad and shyness, as two sep-
arate subjects, the hypostatic abstraction permits two affordances: first, it 
allows us to ask whether the first subject can be preserved analytically or 
empirically independently of the second subject—that is, it allows us to 
interrogate essentiality; second, the reification afforded by the hypostatic 
abstraction allows the abstracted property to feature in judgments independ-
ently of the first subject.10
Applied to medicine, the hypostatic abstraction allows us to talk of condi-
tions, disorders, and diseases—of “things” a person “has.” It then allows us 
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to interrogate whether those “things” belong to the person’s essential nature 
(the first affordance noted above).11 Clinical diagnosis is a form of hypostatic 
abstraction; it transforms a suffering human being into a human being plus 
suffering. Instead of saying Mahmoud is depressed, we say Mahmoud is af-
fected with depression; instead of saying Lisandra is schizophrenic, we say 
Lisandra is affected with schizophrenia.12 Medicine operates in the logical 
and semantic space made possible by the hypostatic abstraction. With the 
question of essentiality now posed, the clinical encounter—typically and ini-
tially—assumes that the condition is not part of the person’s essential nature. 
The aim, at this early stage, is to return the person to the state he was in 
prior to the onset of the condition. This requires that the condition is distin-
guished from the person’s pre-condition state, for otherwise that state cannot 
be recovered. Here, the hypostatic abstraction is central to the promise and 
the hope that are a feature of many clinical encounters. A typical scenario 
goes like this: You go to the doctor following experiences of distress (e.g., 
painful limb, emotional states) and/or disability (e.g., impediments to daily 
functioning) that you deem to be of a medical nature. The doctor takes a 
history, examines you, and carries out some investigations. At that point she 
may offer a diagnosis, inform you about the condition that you have, the 
treatment regimen you need to follow, and the prognosis you can expect. 
Implicit in this interaction is the doctor’s promise and the patient’s hope that 
both will work together to bring the patient back to the state he or she was 
in prior to the condition, if possible.
As doctors and patients know, promises and hopes of this kind are fre-
quently shattered in medicine. Perhaps the condition is difficult to treat and 
the person’s pre-condition state is under threat of being lost forever; per-
haps the condition is chronic and the person has to learn to live with it. In 
such cases, the hypostatic abstraction is not necessarily abandoned—we still 
talk about a person affected with cancer and another affected with chronic 
pain. And sufferers, in some contexts, talk about “fighting” cancer and “tri-
umphing” over chronic pain, attitudes that indicate a separation between 
the condition and the person, and an ongoing attempt to imagine oneself 
without cancer and without pain. There could also come a point where 
the consensus is that the person will never get better, that their condition 
is terminal, upon which palliation becomes necessary. At that point, there 
is acknowledgment that the person’s pre-condition state is unrecoverable; 
in terminal illness, the promise and hope that ordinarily infuse the clinical 
encounter are gone, and the hypostatic abstraction is no longer necessary.
Moving on to the second affordance noted above, the hypostatic ab-
straction allows patient and doctor to hold a unique moral attitude to-
ward the problem as something to be treated and cured. This, in turn, 
allows the doctor to hold a particular attitude toward the patient. With the 
condition now conceived of as separate from the person, he or she can 
inhabit the sick role, and efforts can be directed at treating the condition 
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without the distraction of moral judgment. The hypostatic abstraction 
diverts judgment from the person and onto the condition; the person 
is not “disagreeable,” it is the illness that is “terrible.” Modern medicine 
does not see itself involved in moral judgment of people’s character. 
When a person is diagnosed with schizophrenia, that does not make him 
weak or sinful—schizophrenia is not seen as a character fault: it is an 
illness.13 Of course, people are sometimes blamed for the lifestyle that 
led to the illness—alcoholism and liver cirrhosis is an example—but once 
they have the illness, the illness itself can be the target of disapprobation 
and not the person.
In summary, the two affordances of the hypostatic abstraction are as fol-
lows: (1) separating the condition from the person’s pre-condition state in 
order that the latter can be recovered (at least until it is evident that it cannot 
be recovered) and (2) diverting moral judgment away from the person and 
onto the illness.
As I stated toward the end of Section II, the hypostatic abstraction is central 
to psychiatry’s identity, at the institutional level, as a medical specialty that 
treats conditions, disorders, or diseases that afflict persons.14 Accordingly, 
psychiatry benefits from the aforementioned affordances, and in virtue of 
them is able to distinguish itself from other approaches to human suffering. 
To demonstrate this, consider the contrast of the hypostatic abstraction, 
which is a precisive abstraction; that is, propositions that consist in a subject 
and a predicate instead of a relation between two subjects. Instead of x [has/
possesses/is affected by] y, we go back to x is y. To affirm that x is y is to 
affirm an identity—a self-relation instead of a relation between two subjects. 
When my suffering is related to my y-ness, the person seeking to help me 
will seek to work on my y-ness, which is to work on my identity. Because 
I am, in part, defined by y, any judgment that y incurs is also a judgment that 
I incur. Accordingly, we lose the protection from moral judgment that was 
(potentially) afforded by the hypostatic abstraction: if y is bad or good, then 
so am I. Precisive abstraction characterizes certain non-medical approaches 
to human suffering. For example, in some religious traditions, symptoms of 
depression and anxiety are understood to be the psychological attributes 
of a self that had deviated from the proper path of spiritual development 
(see Rashed, 2015). These symptoms could then be further understood as 
indicating the need for spiritual renewal. In such cases, the person is not 
considered to be affected by these symptoms in a way that leaves his identity 
untouched, but to be defined by them. Apprehended through a precisive ab-
straction, the depressed person becomes liable to moral judgment in virtue 
of being depressed. By contrast, the hypostatic abstraction enables psych-
iatry to distinguish itself from such approaches to human suffering. I would 
go further and state that one cannot make sense of the distinctive approach 
of psychiatry if the hypostatic abstraction is omitted from the description of 
that approach.
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While psychiatry’s commitment to the hypostatic abstraction opens it up to 
potentially useful affordances, it closes off the possibility of a different sort 
of language. When we apprehend a person’s suffering through a precisive 
abstraction, the language of identity-making, self-creation, and of good and 
bad ways of life becomes available to us. While such normative notions can 
be problematic if they are employed uncritically to pass judgment on other 
people’s lives, they can provide people with the resources to understand 
their suffering and their experiences in a richer, more personal, and more 
fulfilling way than is possible through the linguistic affordances of the hypo-
static abstraction. But I am running ahead of the purpose of this section, 
which is to outline the hypostatic abstraction, and to show that it is central 
to psychiatry’s identity at the institutional level.
Before continuing, it is important to distinguish psychiatry’s identity at 
the institutional level from the understanding that some psychiatrists have 
of what they do on a day-to-day basis. They could point out that the hypo-
static abstraction is not central to their work, and that they do not posit the 
problem as a “condition” connected to, but distinguishable from, the person. 
They could argue that what they do is help persons cope with distressing ex-
periences and regain their independence and social engagement. They could 
add that while they might offer a diagnosis for insurance and other bureau-
cratic purposes, in practice they do not labor under a diagnostic under-
standing, nor do they suggest one to the person. These are important efforts 
and, indeed, they seem to offer a (potentially) accommodating response to 
the challenge of Mad activism. But they do raise a host of questions: if the 
aforementioned psychiatrists do not labor under a diagnostic understanding, 
what understanding do they seek in the clinical encounter? How do they 
frame the encounter now that they have abandoned the hypostatic abstrac-
tion? What sort of alternative language do they employ? And what treatment 
goals do they seek with the person in the clinic? Now, it could be proposed 
that the answers to these questions will be individual, because they de-
pend on the wisdom and experience of each psychiatrist. Of course, that 
will not do. For we cannot base a professional practice on such arbitrary 
standards, nor can we rest content with luck playing such a huge role in 
determining whom the person will see in the clinic. If individual psychiatrists 
regularly work outside the space of the hypostatic abstraction—which some 
Mad activists might welcome—then the concepts that underpin their work 
need to be explicitly specified—which some Mad activists might demand. 
Accordingly, we are still confronted by the challenge of Mad activism.
IV. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE OF MAD ACTIVISM
What conceptual resources would enable the clinical encounter to pro-
ceed without requiring the hypostatic abstraction and, in this way, to 
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accommodate the challenge of Mad activism? That is the task we need 
to consider, but first let me state a response that tries to shy away from 
this task.
Psychiatry can respond by limiting the cohort of individuals under its 
purview to those who consider themselves to have a condition, that is, to 
those who effect a hypostatic abstraction on themselves and frame their ex-
periences and situation in medical terms. This might seem like an obvious 
response: if I do not consider myself to have a mental health problem, then a 
psychiatrist is in no position to see me. But it is also an unrealistic response. 
The fact that a person rejects the hypostatic abstraction does not mean that 
he or she might not benefit from support to understand and manage experi-
ences that are often challenging. Furthermore, under current arrangements 
in many countries around the world, people in distress, including many 
who do not effect on themselves a hypostatic abstraction, often end up be-
fore a psychiatric setting. Until existing arrangements are radically different 
from what they are, psychiatrists will continue to have a major role to play 
in the assessment and care of mental difference, distress, and disability. 
Accordingly, it is important to develop the conceptual resources by which 
clinicians can offer appropriate care to the people they see, including those 
who do not consider themselves to have a condition.
The ideal response is for psychiatry to develop into a discipline that is 
able to work with individuals who regard their experiences as part of their 
identity, as well as those who consider themselves to have a condition. 
This response can address the shortcomings of the aforementioned one. It 
allows psychiatry to maintain its identity as a medical specialty, and it ren-
ders explicit that psychiatrists need to develop an additional conception of 
what they are doing that would enable them to satisfactorily respond to the 
persons they see who reject the hypostatic abstraction. In order to unpack 
what this conception is, I  return to the moment of the clinical encounter, 
because it is in that moment that the challenge of Mad activism is clearly 
demonstrated.
Every clinical encounter is framed by two basic issues:
 • For what kind of understanding of the situation should the clinical en-
counter aim?
 • What is the therapeutic aim of the encounter as a whole?
The answers to these questions determine how the encounter will proceed. 
Typically, they are not addressed at the end of the interaction, but before 
it begins, and the answers will vary with whether one is seeing a psych-
iatrist or, say, a psychoanalytic psychotherapist or an occupational ther-
apist. Often, the psychiatrist and the person will disagree on the answers 
to these two questions, which can hinder the therapeutic process or be 
taken as a justification for coercive interventions. As many clinicians would 
recognize, common answers to these questions are as follows: In terms 
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of understanding, the psychiatrist encourages the person to attain insight, 
which amounts to being able to recognize that he is exhibiting the symptoms 
of a “mental disorder.” In terms of therapeutic aim, the most general one is 
symptom control in order to reduce distress, harm, and disability. Now these 
are not the only possible answers, and in what follows I examine other pos-
sibilities guided by the following: Can the clinical encounter be framed in 
such a way that allows the ideal response outlined above? I address the two 
questions in turn.
V. FOR WHAT KIND OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION 
SHOULD THE CLINICAL ENCOUNTER AIM?
For a psychiatrist seeing a prospective patient and contemplating the 
syndrome or syndromes that best describe his subjective reports and be-
havior, one can forget that much had occurred for this meeting to happen. 
As Derek Bolton writes:
The pathway leading to diagnosis of a mental disorder in a person includes at least 
the following three crucial steps: first, someone (often though not necessarily the 
person himself or herself) coming to the belief that the person has a problem, that 
their mental state and behaviour is in some way problematic; second, construal of 
the problem as being a mental health problem, or mental disorder (as opposed to 
being, for example, part of life’s troubles, or a spiritual problem); and third, classi-
fication of the mental health problem as being of a particular kind, such as major 
depression, schizophrenia, or borderline personality. (2010, 328–29)
For the third step (the clinical encounter) to be possible, steps one and 
two need to go a certain way, and they could go otherwise. With regard 
to step one, it may be judged that the problems in mental state and be-
havior that have been identified are not individual problems but are a 
result of a mismatch between dominant cultural norms and the norms 
of a subcultural group to which the person belongs. An example could 
be a person who is considered to be unwell for expressing beliefs and 
engaging in ritualistic behaviors that are otherwise normal in his com-
munity.15 Assuming that the problems identified in step one are not due 
to a mismatch, the process leading to the clinical encounter can still be 
stopped at step two, if the person and/or the community understand 
these problems in, say, religious or spiritual terms. When the first two 
steps go a certain way and we arrive at step three, the scope of under-
standing the problems is more circumscribed. At that stage, there are two 
main issues to consider:
 (1) Clarify the challenges that led to the encounter. Are the persons experi-
encing significant distress and disability? Are they unable to keep up 
with their personal expectations and social duties? Is there a risk of 
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personal harm or harm to others? Is it a family member or someone in 
the community who has expressed worries about those persons?
 (2) Clarify the range of cognitive, emotional, and psychological issues that 
are present. These issues are considered to be related to the challenges 
identified in (1), as somehow being at the root of these challenges or, at 
least, as playing some role in their genesis.
A key task for the clinical encounter is to make the case whereby modifica-
tions in (2) can lead to a reduction in the challenges identified in (1). There 
is, however, a more basic issue that needs to be considered: for whom are 
the challenges identified in (1) challenges: the person or others? If they are 
challenges for the person, then the link between (2) and (1) is relatively 
straightforward. Consider a typical example: A man experiences problems 
with concentration at work and his performance begins to suffer. He feels 
tired most of the time, with a low mood, and has not been able to enjoy 
activities. On many mornings he lacks the motivation to get out of bed. He 
has been calling off-sick with increasing frequency and his position at work 
is becoming untenable. He suspects that his experiences might be mental 
health related and visits a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist offers a diagnosis of 
Moderate Depressive Episode, and a link is drawn between the problems the 
young man has been having at work and his mental states.16 He is offered 
a sick note to allow him time to recover and is prescribed treatment. Given 
the three stages leading to the clinical encounter identified earlier, this man 
arrives at stage three having already begun to understand the challenges as 
being “mental health related.” The psychiatrist, in stage three, offers con-
firmation (or disconfirmation) of this understanding and provides a range of 
treatments and information on prognosis.
A different scenario occurs when the relevant judgments in the first two 
stages leading to the clinical encounter are made by someone else, not by 
the person. As I  noted in Section II, this scenario is quite common, and 
many individuals who end up before psychiatry, end up in this way: a family 
member, a member of the public, a general practitioner, or a social worker 
raises concerns about a person’s mental states or behavior, concerns deemed 
to be mental health related. A typical example is a person who holds bizarre 
or persecutory beliefs, and who begins to profess his beliefs to other people, 
trying with insistence to convert them to his point of view. This leads to 
altercations and, ultimately, to police involvement and a mental health as-
sessment. Another example is a person who hears voices and experiences 
passivity phenomena, and who appears confused in public places, raising 
concerns about her safety. In such cases, the path to the clinical encounter 
is determined by other people taking issue with the person’s behavior and 
mental states.
Depending on the healthcare system in place, that person, either vol-
untarily or involuntarily, is assessed by a mental health practitioner.17 The 
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person, therefore, arrives at the third stage (the clinic) without perceiving 
himself to have mental health related issues. Naturally, such an encounter 
faces complications of a different sort to the scenario discussed previously, 
where the person already understands the challenges he faces in mental 
health terms. One key issue concerns the stance the clinician should take to-
ward the source of the challenges. Should she go along with others and elect 
the person as the source of these challenges? Or should she go along with 
the person in seeing that it is not the person himself but other people’s re-
actions to his mental states and behavior that are the problem?18 Each stance 
allows a different sort of understanding, or insight, to be cultivated in the 
clinical encounter between the psychiatrist and the person. The first stance 
lends itself to primary (or illness) insight, and the second stance lends itself 
to secondary (or social) insight.19 Which stance (and form of insight) can ac-
commodate the challenge of Mad activism (by not requiring the hypostatic 
abstraction)?
Primary (or illness) insight
As stated earlier, many people who end up before psychiatry do not per-
ceive themselves to have a mental health condition. The psychiatrist, on the 
other hand, is in a position to offer a diagnosis. In this scenario, the person 
is elected as the source of the challenges that led to the clinical encounter. 
Accordingly, the kind of understanding, or insight, that is cultivated in the 
clinical encounter centers around the nature of the problem and its manage-
ment. Given the expertise of psychiatrists, the patient can be provided with 
an understanding of the symptoms (e.g., delusions, hallucinations, and pas-
sivity phenomena), as well as diagnostic understanding and accompanying 
psychological and psychobiological theory. The patient’s refusal to accept 
such a set of understandings is reformulated by the psychiatrist as lack of in-
sight. Insight, in the psychiatric context, is defined broadly as “awareness of 
having a mental disorder, of its symptoms and of its implications” (Lincoln, 
Lullmann, and Rief, 2007, 1). The kind of understanding advocated by the 
psychiatrist, therefore, requires the hypostatic abstraction; it requires the pa-
tient to accept that he has a condition.
The clinical assertion that the “patient lacks insight” amounts to saying 
that the person is refusing to attend to his experiences through the hypo-
static abstraction. The person is refusing to go along with the psych-
iatrist and accept that both are tackling the same thing—the “disorder.” 
He does not consider himself to be affected by a condition, rather his 
experience of and interaction with the world is not for him something 
separate from whom he is. On the other hand, the psychiatrist is asking 
him to adopt a stance whereby he is affected by a condition, and then 
to evaluate negatively that thing with which he is affected. These, of 
course, are demanding requirements, and one could argue that it is 
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not reasonable to expect a person to go along with such a radical re-
orientation toward his experiences. As clinical experience shows, insight 
in this sense is often hard to achieve in clinical contexts and, when 
achieved, occurs at the end of a protracted process that frequently in-
volves coercive treatment and daily exposure to psychiatric and clinical-
psychological language.
What we have then is a situation where the hope and the promise that 
are a feature of a typical clinical encounter, and which I noted in Section 
III, no longer coincide: The psychiatrist is still offering the promise that she 
will try to return the patient to the state he was in prior to the condition (by 
controlling the symptoms of the illness). But this promise is not reciprocated 
by the person’s hope, for whatever that hope is, it is not to be cured of who 
he is (even if he wants, or would benefit from, guidance to understand what 
he is going through). The person thus rejects the kind of understanding put 
forward by the clinician. It is evident that a clinical encounter framed solely 
by primary (or illness) insight as the goal of shared understanding requires 
the hypostatic abstraction; accordingly, this notion of insight cannot play a 
role in responding to the challenge of Mad activism. We can now explore the 
second stance noted earlier, and a possible understanding of that to which 
it lends itself.
Secondary (or social) insight
Another stance to adopt toward those who do not regard themselves to 
have a mental health condition is to consider, along with the person, that 
other people’s reactions to his mental states and behavior are the source of 
the challenges that led to the clinical encounter. This stance can then allow 
the person and the psychiatrist to think about these reactions and to make 
them the focus of understanding. Given that the person’s mental states and 
behavior are no longer the primary focus, we can qualify this kind of in-
sight as “secondary” insight. It can also be called “social” insight, since by 
foregrounding the social manifestations of one’s mental states and behavior, 
one can develop a more complex understanding of surrounding norms and 
expectations (without having to agree with them). Furthermore, this kind of 
insight, unlike primary insight, does not require the hypostatic abstraction, 
and therefore it can be an adequate aim for a clinical encounter that seeks 
to accommodate the challenge of Mad activism. What are the features of 
secondary insight?
The term “secondary insight,” in the sense used here, appears sparingly in 
the literature. It is used in passing by Jackson and Fulford in the context of 
thinking about the case studies of three individuals:
All three subjects . . . exhibited a kind of “secondary insight” towards their ex-
periences, in the sense that they recognized that others might see them as being 
bizarre or mad. They were appropriately selective about whom they confided in, 
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and had not previously described their experiences in such detail before the inter-
views. (1997, 48–49)
Elsewhere, I have defined secondary insight as follows:
The subject’s ability to take an observer view of herself and to appreciate that she 
might have deviated from consensual opinion in what she is asserting. In working 
with the patient toward secondary insight, we develop, with the patient, an under-
standing of why other people (the relevant [sub] cultural group) might find her ex-
periences and the language she uses to talk about them unusual or bizarre (Rashed, 
2010, 203).
Secondary insight is a kind of understanding where the person endeavors 
to see herself from the point of view of social norms and values she might 
not subscribe to or agree with but can recognize as possessing some wider 
consensus. These norms and values inform the social reaction to her mental 
states and behavior, the reaction that led to the clinical encounter.
Like primary (or illness) insight, secondary insight involves mediation, by 
which I mean the placement of one’s mental states and behavior in relation 
to something else outside of them. Mediation is not optional: the clinical 
encounter must aim toward a constructive understanding of the situation. 
This understanding provides the conceptual and practical framework for 
intervening in the problems that led to the encounter. With primary insight, 
that framework includes diagnostic constructs and associated psychobio-
logical theory. It allows for individual interventions that can be medical, 
psychological, and/or social in nature. With secondary insight, the person 
is also asked to think outside of himself, yet here he is required to con-
sider himself in light of his understanding of the relevant social contexts. By 
aiming for secondary insight, a person’s understanding of the social effects 
and implications of her beliefs and behaviors are considered more relevant 
than her understanding of psychobiological theory or diagnostic classifica-
tions. If mediation is required for intervention to be possible, what kinds of 
interventions are suggested by secondary (or social) insight?
A focus on secondary insight opens the door for interventions geared to-
ward conflict-resolution. Secondary insight allows for interrogation of the 
circumstances that led to the clinical encounter. Questions such as the fol-
lowing are relevant: How did the conflict/problems between the person and 
others begin, and how did this lead to the clinical encounter? What norms 
have been violated? Whose norms are these? Can these problems be pre-
vented from happening again? What do the various parties need to do to-
ward a solution? In asking these questions, all relevant parties fall into view 
and, where possible, ought to be involved not merely in order to offer a 
collateral history, but as direct parties in the negotiation and potential reso-
lution of the problems.
On the individual level, a focus on secondary insight allows the person to 
understand that certain behaviors are likely to result in the kinds of conflicts 
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that would lead to the clinical encounter. For example, if I  believe with 
conviction that there is a systematic conspiracy by government agencies 
to achieve an end, and if I spend my time trying to convince others of my 
point of view, I  may benefit from understanding that such interventions 
are likely to end in conflict. Developing secondary insight can help reduce 
the incidence of such problems by enabling me to be more discerning in 
whom I discuss my convictions with. Now this might seem like an attempt 
by the psychiatrist to enforce norms of conduct on the person, but in fact it 
is not so. The norms in question already exist in the community—one could 
argue that they are problematic norms and ought to change to accommo-
date a broader range of mental and behavioral difference, perhaps in line 
with the social model of disability (see Rashed, 2019a). However, that kind 
of change is a social, political, and cultural matter, and not something that 
can be actioned in the clinic; it requires collective activism and community 
organizing. On the other hand, the role of the psychiatrist insofar as the 
clinical encounter is concerned is to assist the person she is seeing in the 
clinic, and interventions that require collective social change are outside her 
control.20 By alerting the person to the realities of existing norms and to the 
implications of his behavior, she provides him with opportunities to develop 
social insight and through that to have more control over his situation. This 
can reduce opportunities for conflict, which in turn can reduce the number 
of unwanted admissions to mental health units. In summary, like primary 
insight, secondary insight involves mediation and provides a conceptual and 
practical framework that can bring benefits to the person.
Crucially, for our purposes here, the concept of secondary insight does 
not require the hypostatic abstraction and focuses instead on the social and 
interpersonal conflicts that led to the encounter. Accordingly, the answer to 
the question that led us here—for what kind of understanding of the situ-
ation should the clinical encounter aim if it is to satisfy the challenge of Mad 
activism?—is that the encounter should aim for secondary (or social) insight.
VI. WHAT IS THE THERAPEUTIC AIM OF  
THE ENCOUNTER AS A WHOLE?
Toward the end of Section IV, I identified two issues that frame the clinical 
encounter: the kind of understanding for which the encounter should aim, 
and its therapeutic aim. We can now examine the latter issue. The aim of 
a typical clinical encounter is symptom control in order to reduce distress, 
harm, and disability. Such an aim is consistent with primary (or illness) in-
sight, for once we understand the challenges that led to the clinical encounter 
to be a direct result of the range of cognitive, emotional, and psychological 
issues that are present (the “symptoms”), controlling these symptoms pre-
sents itself as an obvious therapeutic aim. In contrast to primary insight, 
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secondary insight focuses on the sources of social disagreement and elects 
the response of others to the person’s mental states and behavior as the 
source of the challenges that led to the clinical encounter. Accordingly, it 
would seem, an encounter that takes secondary insight as the aim of under-
standing has nothing to say to the range of cognitive, emotional, and psy-
chological issues that are present, except to acknowledge their social impact. 
In what follows, I want to argue that this does not have to be the case and 
that an encounter framed by secondary insight can still attend therapeutically 
to the person’s mental life without falling back on the hypostatic abstraction. 
In fact, the stance of secondary insight is particularly suited for this because 
it frees the encounter from the language of psychopathology and disorder 
and allows for exploration of the meaning and significance of the person’s 
experiences and situation. The encounter can then concern itself not solely 
with symptom control but also with “identity-making.”21
Identity-making
Why should an encounter framed by secondary insight concern itself in any 
way with the person’s mental life? Recall that we are still considering indi-
viduals who do not perceive themselves to have mental health related issues 
and who arrive at the clinical encounter because of other people’s responses 
to their mental states and behavior. From their point of view, there is nothing 
“wrong” with them. But, while they might reject the idea that they are “ill,” 
they might be going through challenging experiences and events and might 
be struggling to make sense of them. They might not wish to understand 
them as conditions to be managed and cured, but that does not mean that 
the question of how to understand these phenomena is resolved.
It is widely recognized that people experiencing phenomena such as 
voices, “passivity” experiences, and other changes in the unity and continuity 
of self, are actively engaged in attempts to make sense of their experiences 
and incorporate them in their developing identity (their self-understanding) 
(see, e.g., Barker, Campbell, and Davidson, 1999; Larsen, 2004; Geekie and 
Read, 2009). This process is affected by many factors, including the nature 
and intensity of experiences, available narratives, individual creativity, and 
the input of family members and experts (Rashed, 2012). Such attempts are 
not always successful and can produce narratives that are fragmented or 
idiosyncratic (“delusional”) (see Phillips, 2003, 327–331). With “delusional” 
narratives, the subject organizes his experience around a systematized core 
of persecution or exaggerated self-importance. A fragmented narrative, on 
the other hand, is a failed narrative, a consequence of the subject’s inability 
to transcend intense emotional experiences and cognitive challenges. In 
many cases, therefore, individuals require support to construct a narrative 
that can bring a sense of order and meaning to their experiences, while re-
taining a basis in a shared understanding.
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Assisting individuals with constructing an identity is a recognized aim in 
the literature. In Towards Humanism in Psychiatry, Jonathan Glover (2003, 
532) writes that one aim of a humanist psychiatry “is to improve people’s 
damaged or impaired capacity for living a good human life.” Among the many 
factors that enter into a good life, Glover considers “self-creation” (or identity-
making) to be of fundamental importance. Reflecting a similar concern, 
Jennifer Radden (2003, 359) argues that “some of the task of attributing and 
constructing self-identity may be one that can be undertaken by others when 
the patient’s own identity-constructing capabilities are compromised,” a task 
that can be adopted among the goals of therapy (Radden, 1996, Chapter 13). 
In his essay How Do I Learn to Be Me Again? Grant Gillett (2012, 249) writes 
that when people are ill, they need a “guide, an informant” who engages them 
in a “reasoned, respectful discussion . . . that enables [them] to assume and 
enact identities and to live out life stories each with its unique value.”
Identity-making, as described here, indicates the what of the therapeutic 
aim of the clinical encounter but not the how. If we accept identity-making 
as a valid aim for the encounter, and one that does not require the hypostatic 
abstraction (satisfying the challenge of Mad activism), how can individuals 
be supported in achieving this aim?
A key issue to note is the context where individuals will be assisted with 
the process of identity-making. Glover and Radden suggest endeavors of the 
kind one would see in clinical practice. Psychiatrists can begin the process 
by inquiring about a person’s broad understanding of what is happening to 
her. They can, as Gillet suggests, act as a “guide, an informant” for the per-
sons they see.22 The role of the guide raises its own complexities, for a guide 
must possess some prior understanding of the situation or, at least, be able 
to direct the person to those who do. In this context, some mental health 
groups and networks, including those involved in activism, are of crucial 
importance. These groups engage in the construction of counter-narratives 
of psychological, emotional, and behavior diversity.23 Narratives such as 
“healing voices,” “dangerous gifts,” and “spiritual emergence” are alterna-
tives to diagnostic language and to clinical-psychological formulation.24 They 
are intended to capture something fundamental about the meaning and sig-
nificance of phenomena of madness without, in many cases, requiring the 
hypostatic abstraction. Psychiatrists can learn about these narratives in order 
to work with them in the clinical encounter. Ultimately, shared narratives are 
blueprints that can help a person make sense of her experiences and adopt 
a broader and unifying perspective on what is happening to her. In being 
worked out in a group, these narratives are more likely to achieve a degree 
of social intelligibility and can play a role in tempering the excesses and 
idiosyncrasies of the subjective narratives with which the person might ini-
tially present. Additionally, psychiatrists can learn about the various mental 
health networks and encourage the persons they see to engage with ap-
propriate ones. Networks such as the Hearing Voices Movement (Longden, 
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Corstens, and Dillon, 2013), Open Dialogue and Soteria (Thomas, 2013), and 
the Icarus Project (DuBrul, 2014) are avenues where people can get together 
and develop a shared understanding of their experiences; in such cases, 
people can act as guides and informants to each other.
So far in the discussion, the assumption has been of an individual who (1) 
rejects the hypostatic abstraction and (2) is able to work toward secondary in-
sight and identity-making. That second assumption, as many clinicians would 
recognize, is one that cannot always be made. A person with severe thought 
disorder can struggle to communicate; another person’s sense of self can be 
fragmented to the point where the question of identity cannot be raised; and 
another can experience social withdrawal and persecutory fears sufficient to 
prevent interaction with others. This is to be contrasted with those who ex-
perience unusual phenomena (such as “passivity” phenomena and voices) 
but are able to interact socially, partake fruitfully in the clinical encounter, 
join groups, and develop with others a shared understanding of their experi-
ences. For those who are not (yet) able to engage in identity-making, the kind 
of support they need is not to author an identity but to regain basic cognitive 
and psychological functions. All of this is true, but the fact that some people 
have severe communication and interpersonal difficulties owing to particular 
psychological, emotional, and cognitive challenges does not have to under-
mine the new ways for thinking about the clinical encounter for which I have 
been arguing in this paper. We must not define the entire mental health field 
by either extreme end of functional ability, neither by those who are mad 
and “ill” nor by those who are mad and “well.” People who are “ill” can get 
“better” and be able to engage with the clinical encounter. This raises ques-
tions concerning the kind of care they need to be able to get to this point, and 
how it can be delivered respectfully, safely, and ethically. These questions 
recall ongoing concerns in psychiatric ethics, problems often discussed under 
mental capacity, harm to self and others, and the justifications for involuntary 
treatment. Rethinking the clinical encounter in terms of secondary insight and 
identity-making is not going to make these questions disappear but can pro-
vide an opportunity to consider them in a new light.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The identity of psychiatry as a medical speciality has often been challenged. 
Among the challenges noted in the introduction, this paper focused on Mad 
activism. Some activists reject a core principle underlying medical theory and 
practice, a principle based on a hypostatic abstraction: doctors treat condi-
tions, disorders, or diseases; they treat “things” that people “have.” In order 
for psychiatry to accommodate the challenge of Mad activism, it needs to de-
velop into a discipline that is open to working in the clinical encounter both 
with primary (or illness) insight in cases where persons effect a hypostatic 
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abstraction on themselves, as well as with secondary (or social) insight in 
cases where persons reject the hypostatic abstraction. While primary in-
sight lends itself to a range of psychological and medical interventions, sec-
ondary insight allows for interventions that can help reduce opportunities 
for social conflict and, therefore, reduce unwanted admissions to mental 
health units. Additionally, a clinical encounter framed by secondary insight 
as the aim of understanding can adopt identity-making as a therapeutic goal 
without requiring the hypostatic abstraction. Many people who present be-
fore psychiatry are concerned with making sense of experiences that are 
often challenging and defy easy understanding. By working toward identity-
making, psychiatrists can assist these individuals without the assumption that 
they have a condition to be managed or cured.
The challenge of Mad activism provides an opportunity to rethink the 
basic framing of the clinical encounter. I  have argued that secondary in-
sight and identity-making are key concepts that can be explicitly adopted 
alongside primary insight and symptom control. But to rethink the clinical 
encounter is not, yet, to rethink the entirety of mental health practice. There 
are several questions on which I have not touched or only minimally so. 
For example, what role do diagnostic practices have, if any, in encounters 
framed by secondary insight and identity-making? What should happen with 
persons who appear to lack capacity for certain decisions and who present 
a risk to themselves or to others? What role is there for symptom control 
alongside identity-making, and what ethical problems does this raise? What 
sort of additional training do clinicians need in order to be able to work with 
the concepts suggested here? All of these are important questions, but we 
can now reconsider them in light of the concepts advanced in this paper, 
and in the context of a clinical encounter that endeavors to accommodate 
the challenge of Mad activism.
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NOTES
 1. Disclosure: in this paper, reflections on the clinical encounter and on medical education and 
practice arise, in part, from my observations and experiences over the past 25 years, first as a medical stu-
dent and junior doctor at Cairo University Medical School and Hospitals, then as an orthopedic surgeon 
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in the north of England and, subsequently, as a psychiatrist in several community clinics, hospitals, and 
prisons in London. After practicing psychiatry for several years, I moved on to full-time research and 
teaching in philosophy and psychiatry.
 2. With regard to the normative complexity of psychiatry, debates revolve around the definition of 
the concept of mental disorder, and the role of values versus facts in defining the boundaries of illness 
(see, e.g., Boorse, 2011; Bolton, 2008, 2013b; Bolton and Banner, 2012). Debates on the explanatory com-
plexity of psychiatry center around the role of, and interaction among, biological and psychosocial factors 
in the explanation of disorder (Bolton, 2013a, 25; Hernandez and Blazer, 2006; Baker and Menken, 2001; 
Huda, 2019). Connected to this, a question that is often raised is whether mental disorders can be con-
sidered as brain disorders (White, Rickards, and Zeman, 2012). With regard to classificatory complexity, 
the issues center on the nature of mental disorders and the validity of existing classifications (Kinderman 
et al., 2013; Horwitz and Wakefield, 2007). Often, the problem is framed by asking whether mental dis-
orders are natural kinds (Jablensky, 2016; Kendell and Jablensky, 2003; Zachar, 2015; Haslam, 2002; 
Cooper, 2013; Simon, 2011).
 3. The four challenges identified in the text are not the only ones. The following is a nonexhaustive 
list of some additional problems. There are well-known difficulties and controversies surrounding the 
efficacy and risks of antidepressant and antipsychotic medication (see, e.g., Moncrieff, 2013); ethical 
concerns surrounding the treatment of depression (see, e.g., Hoffman, 2013); distinctive ethical complex-
ities arising from the fact that mental health patients can be particularly vulnerable, raising questions of 
capacity not ordinarily raised in other medical specialities (see, e.g., Radden and Sadler, 2010); and com-
plexities surrounding the metaphysics of psychiatry (see, e.g., Zachar, 2014; Maiese, 2016).
 4. For the history of mental health activism, consult Crossley (2006) and Rashed (2019b, Chapter 1). 
The website of the Survivors’ History Group is an invaluable resource: http://studymore.org.uk/mpu.htm.
 5. For accounts of Mad Pride and mad-positive activism, consult Curtis et al. (2000), Finkler (1997), 
Reaume (2008), Sen (2011), Triest (2012), Costa (2015), Clare (2011), Polvora (2011), and deBie (2013). 
See Hoffman (2019) for some distinctions among different types of Mad Pride activism.
 6. In this article, I do not consider issues of risk to self and/or others, nor do I consider questions 
of involuntary treatment and when it is justified. What I am concerned with is a more basic framing issue 
that could change how the clinical encounter is conducted and how risk is appraised and managed. 
Please see the Conclusion section for suggestions for further work. 
 7. Oxford English Dictionary (online: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/abstraction).
 8. See Peirce (1958, paragraph 235 of volume 4, and paragraph 534 of volume 5).
 9. Oxford English Dictionary (online: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/hypostasis) and 
Merriam-Webster dictionary (online: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hypostasis).
 10. When we transform the proposition “Ahmad is shy” to “Ahmad is affected with shyness,” we 
can then ask whether shyness is an essential property of Ahmad or a temporary association that can be 
distinguished from his more enduring properties.
 11. A property is essential to the extent that the object in question would cease to be what it is in 
the absence of this property. For example, it is an essential property of a planet that it orbits around 
a star. For the purpose of this article, it is sufficient that a property is taken to be (or not taken to be) 
an aspect of a person's essential nature. I am not concerned with the actual ontological status of such 
a determination, only with its pragmatic aspects. (For further discussion, see Rashed and Bingham, 
2014, 246–249.)
 12. Zachar and Kendler (2007, 559) refer to a similar view when they make the distinction between 
entities and agents. The entity perspective of psychiatric disorders views “individuals as vehicles for 
pathological syndromes” (recalling the hypostatic abstraction), while the agent perspective attempts “to 
focus on persons more than on patients.” However, beyond making the distinction, the authors do not 
subject it to further exploration.
 13. The fundamental intuition underlying illness attributions is that persons are unable to do what 
they want to do or to meet social expectations, “not because they are naughty, lazy, rude, bad, weak-
willed, or insincere—but because they are ill” (Bolton, 2013b, 445). Illness, on this view, is a form of 
incapacity that the person cannot help and hence is not to be condemned for.
 14. Note that the hypostatic abstraction is not synonymous with mental disorder diagnoses, even 
if such diagnoses are exemplary exemplars of it. We can “drop the language of disorder,” as some are 
advocating (Kinderman et al., 2013), while still regarding the phenomena in question as something the 
person has or possesses rather than as attributes of the person. It is also not synonymous with a particular 
account of causation. To say that Lisandra is affected with schizophrenia is to leave open the question 
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as to why she is affected, and the answer can include relevant causal factors of a social, psychological, 
and biological nature. And neither is it synonymous with the concept of illness. If we understand illness 
as a form of incapacity that the person cannot help and, hence, is not to be condemned for, then this 
incapacity can be hypostatically abstracted or not. Finally, the hypostatic abstraction is not synonymous 
with the cultural framework of modern medicine and clinical psychology. In fact, it does not matter what 
the cultural framework is. For example, healers who work within the framework of spirit possession are 
performing a hypostatic abstraction by attributing aspects of the person’s traits and behaviors to a “spirit” 
(in medicine this attribution is made to the “condition”) (see Rashed, 2018).
 15. I address this problem under a discussion of the concept of cultural congruence as applied to 
psychiatric diagnosis (Rashed, 2013). 
 16. Note that this stance is consistent with a range of causal explanations. I could formulate the 
cause of my depressed mood to be long-term psychoactive drug use, or the result of the cumulative 
effects of poverty, or the outcome of an unhealthy perfectionism, or the absence of social support at a 
difficult time, and so on. However, the issue with which I am concerned here is not the casual explan-
ation of the mental states in question, but their relation to the personal and/or social problems that have 
led to the clinical encounter.
 17. Voluntarily, people might agree to attend the assessment for a number of reasons, despite not 
considering themselves to have a mental disorder. They might do so to assuage the worries of a family 
member or to prove them wrong. Or they might have other issues they want medical support with, such 
as insomnia or anxiety. Or they might have challenging experiences and want to discuss this with a 
mental health professional.
 18. Note that these two stances are not mutually exclusive; you can hold different stances toward 
different problems.
 19. It is evident that each stance maps onto a medical model of disability versus a social model of 
disability framework: if I think other people are the problem, then what needs to happen is for other 
people to change in order to accommodate my behavior. At this stage, however, I am not concerned with 
interventions, but with the kind of understanding that can be the aim of the clinical encounter. 
 20. Doctors, including psychiatrists, can, of course, be agents for social change. They can lobby the 
government, engage in activism and community organizing, and, in general, attempt to realize their pol-
itical values in the sphere of healthcare provision. All of this occurs outside the clinic: the clinic cannot 
be the site where doctors prioritize their political agendas because this can conflict with the patient’s. 
It can place the patient in the position of being a means to the doctor’s political ends, which is morally 
problematic. In short, being an agent for social change is not coextensive with—and hence can conflict 
with—being an agent for the patient’s interests.
 21. The qualification ‘not solely’ indicates that identity-making and symptom control are not mu-
tually exclusive goals, as long as ‘symptom control’ is disentangled from diagnosis and the hypostatic 
abstraction. A person might reject the hypostatic abstraction (and opt for an alternative understanding of 
her experiences and situation) and, at the same time, accept/request medication for particular symptoms 
(to relieve the distress and disability associated with these symptoms). The experience of paranoia, for 
example, can be uniquely distressing, and medication can help with this. But if that is the case, what sort 
of justifications are there for a person who does not believe that he has a mental disorder to take medi-
cation developed for treating mental disorder? And what is the psychiatrist’s position in this situation? 
In an important paper, Marga Reimer (2010) points to robust empirical evidence that many people take 
medication despite ‘poor’ primary (or illness) insight. They do so because, from their point of view, the 
medication does in fact relieve some distress or solve some problem for them. Reimer argues that the 
clinician may offer medication to the person on the person’s own terms, for example as being for diffi-
culties “articulated by the patient himself” (2010, 72). However, such an attitude does raise ethical worries 
concerning openness and honesty about the psychiatrist’s agenda in the clinical encounter, issues that 
require separate consideration.
 22. Note that identity-making (and secondary [or social] insight) are not all or nothing. One can have 
more-or-less social insight, and one can be more-or-less able to make sense of experiences and situations.
 23. For details on these narratives see Rashed (2019b, Chapter 9), DuBrul (2014), Clay (1999), Geekie 
and Read (2009), Peddie (2014), Fletcher (2017), Longden, Corstens, and Dillon (2013), and the documen-
taries Crooked Beauty (the third movie in the Mad Dance Trilogy directed by Ken Rosenthal, 2010) and 
Healing Voices (directed by P. J. Moynihan, 2016). See also Eleanor Longden’s TED TALK: The Voices in my 
Head (2013). Online: https://www.ted.com/talks/eleanor_longden_the_voices_in_my_head/up-next.
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 24. The narratives identified in the text aim to support people by providing them with the cultural 
resources to make sense of their experiences. They aim to enhance people’s lives within the broader 
community, and not to bring harm upon them. It is possible, however, for other narratives to encourage 
ways of life that can bring harm on those who endorse them. Positive narratives surrounding severe 
“eating disorders” (e.g., Pro Ana communities) could be considered by some people as an example of 
this, which goes to show that there is a need for adjudicating among various narratives before they can 
be encouraged. In general, people, clinicians included, cannot be expected to endorse values and beliefs 
that go against their worldview. But because we are dealing with issues of public interest that affect the 
lives of millions of people (i.e., cultural understandings of mental health and their implications), we need 
to provide a reasoned argument for why we are inclined to reject (or indeed accept) a particular narrative 
and the way of life it supports. Elsewhere (Rashed, 2019b, Chapters 5 and 10), I develop a framework for 
adjudicating identity-claims. This framework requires that we examine whether a claim is morally objec-
tionable or irrational and whether a positive case can be made for a particular claim in light of the moral 
and political resources of the theory of recognition.
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